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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the history of the United States, morals-based legislation 
and “romantic paternalism” have placed the idea of female chastity on a 
pedestal and women in a cage.1 Legislators have given reasonable—alt-
hough subjective—rationales to oppose a woman’s control of her own 
body: the belief that life starts at conception and the interest in protecting 
that life; the right to protect religious beliefs and ideals; and the health 
and safety of mothers.2 A historical analysis, however, shows that many 
legislative decisions about controlling a woman’s sexual behavior have 
passed with no other justification but morality.3 This history, in the con-
text of current “traditional values” based legislation, lifts the veil of mo-
rality to reveal the true underlying need for moral regulation: the preser-
vation of power for those in charge. 
“We the People” intended to ensure that the legislative branch of 
government would hear the collective voice of the nation’s people.4 Thus,  
the amount of power held by a particular group is directly correlated to 
the extent that their interests are represented in the legislature. Although 
the 116th Congress is the “most racially diverse and most female group” 
in history,5 it remains overwhelmingly male and white.6 The percentage 
of women in the 116th Congress—at 23.4%—is an all-time high,7 but is 
miniscule considering that women are the majority gender.8 This leaves 
 
 1 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973); see Dana M. Northcraft, A Nation 
Scared: Children, Sex, and the Denial of Humanity, 12 AM. UNIV. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 483, 510 (2004) (reviewing JUDITH LEVINE HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF 
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEX (2002)). 
 2 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138-39 (1973) (describing states that enacted 
anti-abortion legislation under such rationales); Religious Exemptions and Accommodations 
for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 
57,536, 57,551 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 
C.F.R. pt. 147); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive 
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592, 57,608 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 3 See infra Section III.B. 
 4 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 5 Catie Edmondson & Jasmine C. Lee, Meet the New Freshmen in Congress: More Dem-
ocrats, Diversity and Women, N.Y. TIMES, http://perma.cc/7G44-9RQ7 (last updated Nov. 30, 
2018). In addition, “[m]ost of the [elected] women . . . replac[ed] men who held these seats 
before them.” Denise Lu & Keith Collins, ‘Year of the Woman’ Indeed: Record Gains in the 
House, N.Y. TIMES, http://perma.cc/Z98Z-C9Y3 (last updated Nov. 16, 2018). 
 6 The 116th Congress is 76.6% male and 79% white. See Beatrice Jin, Congress’s In-
coming Class Is Younger, Bluer, and More Diverse than Ever, POLITICO, 
http://perma.cc/F4WD-ZNU8 (last updated Nov. 28, 2018, 12:43 PM). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Women comprise 51% of the U.S. population. Abigail Geiger & John Gramlich, The 
Changing Face of Congress in 5 Charts, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 2, 2017), http://perma.cc/3WFS-
ACYB. Women only comprised 5.0% of the 101st Congress in 1989, and, until 1993, there 
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little question as to who holds the power in this country, and therefore, 
who is in the best position to safeguard their own interests. Maintaining 
the existing and historical legislature and economic hierarchy ensures that 
men will continue to control governmental functions and the social struc-
ture. Because a women’s ability to “participate equally in the economic 
and social life of the Nation” is reliant on “their ability to control their 
reproductive lives,” the legislature’s sexual regulation of women has 
served at the forefront of its campaign to maintain the traditional power 
structure.9 By relying on “morality,” legislators have placed women’s 
sexuality at the center of values-based regulation; they have used it as a 
key tool to reserve their own decision-making power and to protect cer-
tain rights and liberties over others.10 In light of the 45th presidential Ad-
ministration’s (the Administration) recent actions to curtail women’s sex-
ual and reproductive rights, it’s important to frame this discussion in 
context of the government’s past efforts to limit these rights, and to ex-
pose the government’s underlying intentions of passing these regulatory 
actions. 
The regulation of morality was a driving force in American law until 
the twentieth century, when the judiciary became a key player in shifting 
the boundaries of moral legislation.11 It is undisputed that the Govern-
ment, at one time, sought to preserve order and public morals.12 The issue, 
however, is that morals change, and subjective human opinion dictates 
morals. In fact, “public morality”—the public’s “widely shared moral 
sentiment given the force of law”—dictated legislation for a long time.13 
Under the concept of public morality, laws can shape societal behavior in 
two ways: it can reduce the occurrence of certain conduct, preventing the 
formation of undesirable habits, and it can prompt a “complex mixture of 
forces that contribute to the shaping of people’s moral ideas.”14 Con-
versely, the absence of laws make certain conduct more widespread and 
 
had never been more than two women in the Senate at a time. See BROOKINGS INST., VITAL 
STATISTICS ON CONGRESS: DATA ON THE U.S. CONGRESS, DEMOGRAPHICS OF MEMBERS OF 
CONGRESS 55 tbl. 1-19 (2018), http://perma.cc/T5MF-H38G. The author recognizes that gen-
der is not limited to “men” and “women.” 
 9 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992). 
 10 This note uses the term “women,” but the author recognizes that said actions also affect 
people that do not identify as women. 
 11 See Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. 
JURIS. 65, 72-73, 92 (2000). 
 12 Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 
391, 403 (1963). 
 13 Daniel F. Piar, Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 
139, 139 (2012). 
 14 Wolfe, supra note 11, at 68 (citing HARRY CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY 
ch. 4 (1969)). 
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insinuate that such conduct is acceptable.15 It is not that legislators should 
never consider moral arguments in governing laws, but, arguably, moral-
ity should be reserved to regulate only certain behaviors. Behavior, too, 
can be private—such as that associated with a woman’s own body—or 
public in nature.16 Due process of law warrants that rational governance 
of societal affairs must be limited to actions that affect one’s neighbor.17 
Therefore, moral arguments should not be used to enforce private moral-
ity—the moral code that is specific only to an individual or a group of 
people. Justice Blackmun articulates this philosophy in his vindicated dis-
sent in Bowers v. Hardwick, where he acknowledges the Court’s failure 
to “see the difference between laws that protect public sensibilities and 
those that enforce private morality.”18 
Nevertheless, since before the Constitution was drafted, legislators 
and courts have relied upon threads of private morality to maintain the 
status quo of a historically white, male dominated power structure.19 
While the law’s evolution has made it more difficult for legislators to rely 
on morality, the nation is seeing a resurgence of efforts to do so with the 
Administration’s plans to: defund Planned Parenthood,20 provide moral 
exemptions for contraception coverage under the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA),21 steeply increase a budget for abstinence-only education,22 and 
 
 15 Id. 
 16 See Henkin, supra note 12, at 403, 406-07. 
 17 See id. 
 18 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 212 (1986) (Blackmun, H., dissenting), overruled 
by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 19 See discussion infra Section II. 
 20 H.J. Res. 43, Pub. L. No. 115-23, 131 Stat. 89 (2017) (nullifying a proposed HHS rule 
that barred states receiving Title X funding from withholding those funds from family plan-
ning service providers for any reason other than their ability or inability to provide Title X 
services); see Jackie Calmes, Obama Bars States from Denying Federal Money to Planned 
Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), http://perma.cc/ZE6D-RTVU (regarding Obama’s 
attempt to bar states from denying federal funds to Planned Parenthood); discussion infra Sec-
tion III.A.iii. 
 21 Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Ser-
vices Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536, 57,551 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147); Moral Exemptions 
and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care 
Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592, 57,608 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147); see discussion infra Section III.A.i. 
 22 But see Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., No. 12CECG02608, 2015 
WL 2298565, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2015) (order granting plaintiffs’ motions in part). 
Compare OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR GREATNESS, FISCAL YEAR 2018 34 
(2017) [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2018] (extending abstinence education) with OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
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abruptly end scientifically-designed programs that aim to reduce teen 
pregnancy.23 These regulatory efforts are several among many attacks that 
have occurred on the federal level under the Administration. The Admin-
istration anticipates more initiatives in the upcoming years, particularly 
given its strong commitment to filling the federal courts with judges that 
hold pro-life ideologies.24 This note collectively refers to these govern-
ment actions as the “Procreation Prescription.”25 
The Administration’s efforts to regulate certain behavior are shaped 
by, what Justice Kennedy has said, “conceptions of right and acceptable 
behavior, and respect for the traditional family.”26 While considering the 
dark history that links the regulation of women’s sexuality to the Admin-
istration’s efforts to restrain women’s political, social, and economic 
power, this note argues that the Administration is unconstitutionally rely-
ing on the veil of morality to regulate sexuality. To provide context on 
how sexual regulation is a tool of women’s oppression, Section I offers a 
brief background on the importance of contraception to women’s equality 
and, thus, a women’s potential for power. Section II lays the groundwork 
for how power is defined and maintained—particularly through the regu-
lation of sexuality—and elaborates on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
surrounding the use of morality in decision-making. Section III discusses 
the then-and-now of the “Procreation Prescription.” Specifically, Section 
III shares an overview of the federal government’s recent actions to cur-
tail women’s sexual and reproductive freedom, and contextualizes these 
actions with the government’s prior reliance on different versions of mo-
rality to limit women’s sexual autonomy. 
 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017 140 (2016) [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2017] (eliminating ab-
stinence education, resulting in a savings of $75 million in 2017-2028); discussion infra Sec-
tion III.A.ii. 
 23 Policy & Research, L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 313 F. Supp. 3d 
62 (D.D.C. 2018); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., HHS Announces 
Proposed Update to Title X Family Planning Grant Program (May 22, 2018), 
http://perma.cc/F8GE-DKFG; see discussion infra Section III.A.iv. 
 24 See, e.g., Mark Berman, Trump Promised Judges Who Would Overturn Roe v. Wade, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2017, 10:02 AM), http://perma.cc/T7CQ-XRAR; see also Garza v. 
Hargan, 874 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, and vacating as moot sub nom. Azar v. 
Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018). The list of attacks on women’s sexual health at the state level 
is beyond the scope of this note. 
 25 The Administration’s efforts to define “sex” in a way that excludes gender and mini-
mizes the existence of trans-persons is also included, but is beyond the scope of this note. See, 
e.g., Molly Olmstead, The Department of Education Will no Longer Investigate Transgender 
Student Bathroom Complaints, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2018, 10:01 AM), http://perma.cc/6FZP-
PQQQ. 
 26 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003). 
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Morals are undoubtedly “profound and deep convictions . . . [that] 
determine the course of [people’s] lives.”27 The importance of moral be-
liefs in society is not at issue before us, however. The issue is whether the 
State may enforce a private code of conduct on the whole society through 
the law28—under the veil of morality—when history clearly sheds light 
on the discriminatory intent of moral regulation.29 Because society’s un-
derstanding of acceptable behavior, including gender-based roles, has 
evolved over time, it is not sustainable to base legislation specifically on 
moral justification. Over the past fifty years, courts have increasingly con-
demned the reliance on morality in shaping the law—although outside of 
reproductive rights—and this reliance cannot be upheld now in the con-
text of women’s equality.30 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTRACEPTION COVERAGE FOR WOMEN’S 
EQUALITY 
“Women belong in all places where decisions are being made.”31 
– Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
The discussion of reproductive rights in mainstream culture often 
omits that these rights do not exist independently for women. What’s also 
at stake is women’s right to equally participate in society; to access class 
mobility, economic security, workforce participation, and educational at-
tainment; and to direct their own upbringing.32 For example, women born 
in the mid-1940s to the early 1950’s received roughly a one-third increase 
in their total wage gains because of birth control availability alone.33 
The Administration’s recent regulatory efforts to curtail reproductive 
rights target more single women and low-income families than women 
overall. To begin with, women earn disproportionately less than their 
 
 27 Id. at 571. 
 28 See id.; David B. Cruz, “The Sexual Freedom Cases”? Contraception, Abortion, Ab-
stinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 377 (2000) (“If person crea-
tion is, constitutionally speaking, such a personal matter subject to such widely differing 
views, then, arguably, it is inappropriate for government to adopt blanket policies attempting 
to tax people with conceiving and giving birth as a way of deterring certain sexual conduct.”). 
 29 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. 
 30 See id. at 559; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 n.7 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 n.11 (1967). 
 31 Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY (May 5, 2009), 
http://perma.cc/KG7L-DDSN (emphasis added). 
 32 See Complaint at 6, ACLU v. Wright, No. 3:17-cv-05772 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2017) 
[hereinafter ACLU Complaint]. 
 33 Id. at 8 (citing Martha J. Bailey et al., The Opt-In Revolution? Contraception and the 
Gender Gap in Wages, 4 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 225 (2012)). 
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male counterparts.34 Heterosexual women living in two-income house-
holds, presumably those in marriages or serious relationships, and mid-
dle-high income single women are much more likely to afford birth con-
trol without the support from their employers’ health plans.35 Birth control 
costs have been a major obstacle for women and have played an important 
role in women’s birth control decisions.36 Inconsistent contraceptive use 
accounts for about forty-one percent of unplanned pregnancies.37 As a re-
sult, it is poor women that are most at risk of unplanned pregnancies.38 A 
country where some women, but not others, have access to control their 
sexual freedom and their reproductive destiny runs counter to established 
principles of equality.39 
In a woman’s life, her “twenties” look much different than they did 
thirty years ago40 due to the availability of contraception. A woman’s en-
try into adulthood was traditionally equated with their marital, maternal, 
and household duties.41 The option to wait to marry or to have children, 
along with the expectation or the desire to enter the workforce, has rede-
fined young adulthood for women. This period is now one of self-growth, 
education, skill acquisition, networking, and exploration of both job and 
relationship prospects.42 This exploration and self-growth pays off hand-
somely for families and women in their thirties. It leads to more independ-
ent and financially secure women who know what to look for in a mate.43 
College educated women who experience this growth are the only group 
in society whose marriage rates have increased, and whose divorce rates 
 
 34 Id. at 5 (citing FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVS. 
FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 19 (2011)). 
 35 See id. The Administration has reinforced this idea to support the rule: “If a woman 
loses coverage of her chosen contraceptive method through her employer, she may still have 
access to such contraceptive coverage through a spouse’s (or parent’s) plan. Or she may oth-
erwise be willing and able to pay for contraceptive services out of pocket . . . .” Brief for the 
Federal Appellants at 38, State of California v. Azar, Nos. 18-15144, 18-15166, 18-15255, 
2018 WL 1831303 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2018). 
 36 See ACLU Complaint, supra note 32, at 8 (“[W]hen cost was not an obstacle, more 
women chose long acting contraception methods such as IUDs . . . .”). 
 37 Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 584 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (order granting a 
preliminary injunction). 
 38 See id. at 568. 
 39 See Robin West, Hobby Lobby, Birth Control, and Our Ongoing Cultural Wars: Pleas-
ure and Desire in the Crossfires, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 67, 88 (2016). 
 40 See Naomi R. Cahn & June Carbone, Lifting the Floor: Sex, Class, and Education, 39 
U. BALT. L.F. 57, 58 (2009). 
 41 See id. at 60. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See id. 
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have decreased, since the period before no-fault divorce and birth control 
availability.44 
Genuine and equal access to opportunities, to stability, and to inde-
pendence reckons that society allow for a woman’s adaptability to direct 
her own upbringing; an adaptability that cannot co-exist with permanent 
consequences for their early behavior—consequences that derail women 
of what they envision for themselves.45 Motherhood implicitly requires 
spending time with children, ensuring that children are well-educated, 
preventing abuse, and providing stable housing—luxuries that may not be 
equally available to all women and, thus, to all children.46 Although pov-
erty does not make for bad parenting—life is much harder without the 
opportunity to invest in oneself first.47 
Aside from the government’s functional arguments to curtail a 
woman’s reproductive rights, a woman’s right to own her sexuality is 
equally important. Birth control provides a woman with a means to con-
trol her own pleasure, granting women the full exercise of their funda-
mental right to bodily autonomy.48 While Lawrence v. Texas has not been 
explicitly extended to women seeking pleasure, it would be a denial of 
equal protection to argue that its holding only extends to sexual beings 
who are not at risk of an unplanned pregnancy.49 Sexual autonomy, as 
applied to all, is simple: “People have a right to decide for themselves 
with whom and under what circumstances to have sex.”50 As long as 
women’s sexuality can be controlled by the law, it will dominate the con-
versation about a woman’s worth. In discussing the impact of sexism on 
civil rights work in the 1950s, Dorothy “Dottie” Zellner, activist and elder 
of the Students Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), shared that 
those outside of her organization often trivialized the work of women be-
cause society perceived women solely as sexual beings.51 Zellner remem-
 
 44 See id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Cahn & Carbone, supra note 40, at 64. 
 47 See id. 
 48 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
 49 See Cruz, supra note 28 (“[A]ny sensible view of the subject must recognize the cen-
trality of controls over sexual behavior and maternity as determinants of women’s place in 
society and in the public life of their communities--in short, of women’s status as equal citi-
zens.”) (quoting KENNETH L. KARST, LAW’S PROMISE, LAW’S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER 
IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 53 (1993)). 
 50 Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 
122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1379 (2013). 
 51 Dorothy Zellner, Activist & Elder, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Comm., Talk with 
the Equality and Justice Clinic of the City University of New York School of Law (Aug. 30, 
2018). 
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bered being contacted by journalists that had a prurient interest in interra-
cial sex, which they assumed was centered in the movement.52 Instead of 
asking about SNCC’s meaningful actions, journalists often cared more 
about “who you f---ed.”53 “It was demeaning,” Zellner recalled, “sexism 
was endemic, you couldn’t move, it was everywhere.”54 To allow the ju-
diciary and the legislature —majority male systems—to debate women’s 
sexual rights, in a courthouse or on the Senate floor, perpetuates main-
stream society’s casual and seemingly acceptable valuation of women be-
cause of their chastity rather than their accomplishments. Until society 
views women as having the same sexual rights as men and, thus, the same 
power as men, continued inequality is inevitable for women. 
II. TOOLS OF POWER: SEXUALITY AND MORALITY 
“The fact that men, myself included, are determining how women 
may choose to manage their reproductive health is a sad irony not 
lost on the Court.”55–  Carlton W. Reeves, District Judge 
The power granted by and to “We the People” directly correlates 
with who is representing the “We” when making legislative decisions.56 
The ability for women to be at the table, to be a part of the “We,” and to 
“participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation” is reli-
ant on “their ability to control their reproductive lives.”57 In “A People’s 
History of the United States,” Howard Zinn describes the United States’ 
system of control as “ingenious,” stating that: “With a country so rich in 
natural resources, talent, and labor power the system can afford to distrib-
ute just enough wealth to just enough people to limit discontent to a trou-
blesome minority.”58 In describing the historical trends to seek quality 
and distributed power, Barack Obama proclaimed: “Each time we pains-
takingly pull ourselves closer to our founding ideals, that all of us are 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id.; For more narratives from women in SNCC, see FAITH S. HOLSAERT ET AL., HANDS 
ON THE FREEDOM PLOW (2010). 
 55 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, No. 3:18-CV-171-CWR-FKB, 2018 WL 
6072127, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 20, 2018) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (ordering per-
manent injunction of a regulation banning abortion after 15 weeks), appeal docketed, No. 18-
60686 (5th Cir. Dec. 17, 2018). In a footnote, Judge Reeves highlights that “women report 
that ‘federal courts are ‘places of discrimination’ . . . where they feel ‘invisible’ and face ‘pain, 
isolation, and injury’ – especially from men cloaked in the robes of justice.’” Id. at *7 n.52 
(quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Adams, No. 3:18-CV-252-CWR-FKB, 2018 WL 2465763, 
at *2 (S.D. Miss. June 1, 2018)). 
 56 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 57 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992). 
 58 HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 570-71 (Longman, 1980). 
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created equal . . . [t]he status quo pushes back . . . . [O]ften . . . manufac-
tured by the powerful and the privileged who want to keep us divided and 
keep us angry and keep us cynical because that helps them maintain the 
status quo and keep their power and keep their privilege.”59 Essentially, 
the more uniformity in voices at the table, the more confident that those 
decision-makers can be that their policies will benefit them the most. Al-
lowing women and people of color to have equal access to the decision-
making discussion—a more equitable distribution of power—shakes the 
reassurance of continued comfort for those historically in charge. Michel 
Foucault, an influential philosopher, historian, author, and social theorist, 
eloquently describes power not as an institution, structure, or strength that 
one is naturally endowed with, but rather as a “complex strategical situa-
tion in a particular society.”60 If power, as Foucault suggests, is only cre-
ated and maintained through the use of language and discourse, then it 
ultimately manifests in the law—and in what the law defines as right and 
wrong.61 It is the government’s binary system that defines power as “licit 
and illicit, permitted and forbidden,” and, therefore, the purest form of 
power resides in the reason of the legislator.62 
Although sexuality is not the most easily governed tool, Foucault ar-
gues that it has the broadest use.63 The use of sex as a tool, under Fou-
cault’s theory, was an intentional decision—a strategy—to reinforce a de-
sirable hierarchy. The power of sex falls within the binary system; it lies 
in sex’s “negative relation”: “rejection, exclusion, refusal, blockage, con-
cealment,” withdrawing consent, and the ability to not consent.64 As his-
tory shows, morality has served as the veil and the vehicle for men to use 
this sexual power to rule over women.65 By convincing society that the 
morals identified were in public’s best interest, the men in power did not 
have to show their hand to reveal their underlying desire to retain control. 
Recently, the Southern District of Mississippi criticized the State legisla-
ture for “gaslighting” by professing one rationale, but clearly representing 
“the old Mississippi” that is “bent on controlling women and minori-
ties.”66 As demonstrated throughout Section III-B, the subjective nature 
 
 59 Transcript of Barack Obama’s Sept. 7 Speech at the University of Illinois, INSIGHT 
NEWS (Sept. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/E358-VRP6. 
 60 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 93 (Robert Hur-
ley trans., Vintage Books 1990). 
 61 See id. at 92. 
 62 Id. at 83. 
 63 See id. at 103. 
 64 Id. at 83. 
 65 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 66 Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, No. 3:18-CV-171-CWR-FKB, 2018 WL 
6072127, at *3 n.22 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 20, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-60686 (5th Cir. Dec. 
17, 2018). 
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of morality provides those in power with an opportunity to contour morals 
into a shape that fits their needs.67 
By the twentieth century, the judiciary became influential in shifting 
the boundaries of moral legislation. Morality once upheld laws prohibit-
ing obscenity, the prohibition of alcohol, no-fault divorce, and fornica-
tion, and then, at a later point, was considered insufficient. “Racial integ-
rity”68 was once considered an acceptable legal ground for upholding 
miscegenation laws because racial purity was, what courts have recently 
referred to as, a “sincerely held moral conviction.”69 A woman’s destiny 
to be a wife and a mother justified laws that forbade women from certain 
careers.70 Since a multitude of laws were grounded in morality, the Court 
upheld them because, otherwise, courts would be “too busy” invalidating 
laws that represent moral choices under the Due Process Clause.71 
The pendulum has shifted, however, towards an acknowledgement 
that morality is an insufficient legal basis for decision-making. As a re-
sult, courts have mostly overturned precedent that relied morality as part 
of a substantive legal argument.72 Some scholars argue that the Due Pro-
cess Clause intervened in the government’s authority to regulate public 
morals.73 In her rewrite of Lawrence v. Texas from a feminist perspective, 
Constitutional Law Professor Ruthann Robson highlights sexual auton-
omy as a right protected by the Due Process Clause.74 She argues that 
where morality coincides with other interests, each of those interests must 
be able to stand on its own.75 Similarly, Louis Henkin, Professor of Law 
and of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University, argues 
that legislation based on private morality poses three issues. First, due 
process demands that laws have “an apparent, rational, utilitarian social 
purpose,” and may not be used “merely to preserve some traditional or 
prevailing view of private morality.”76 Second, legislation cannot be 
 
 67 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 68 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). 
 69 Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 560 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 70 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 71 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“[R]espondent asserts that there must be a rational basis for the law 
and that there is none in this case other than the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate 
in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral . . . . The law, however, is constantly based 
on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invali-
dated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”). 
 72 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); U.S. Dep’t. 
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 n.74 (1973); Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 n.11. 
 73 See Henkin, supra note 12, at 405. 
 74 Ruthann Robson, Lawrence v. Texas, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS 
OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 490 (Linda L. Berger et al. eds., 2016). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Henkin, supra note 12, at 402. 
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founded on “assumptions about character and its corruption,” and, rather, 
must be reasonably related to a proper public interest purpose.77 Last, 
“morals legislation is a relic in the law of our religious heritage.”78 These 
rationales for forbidding moral legislation are apparent in a movement 
that increasingly requires the government and the judiciary to be reason-
able and rational.79 Increasingly, Supreme Court decisions seem to agree 
with Robson and Henkin’s rationale. While it was once considered ac-
ceptable to rely on the condemnation of immoral practices,80 the Court in 
Lawrence overturned the government’s right to enforce those ethical 
standards.81 Justice Kennedy’s majority decision in Lawrence almost ex-
plicitly struck down public morality as a legitimate government interest: 
“Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval, without any other 
asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection 
Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons.”82 
Justice Kennedy did not deny that Bowers made an accurate point: 
Homosexual conduct had been condemned as immoral for centuries,83 but 
he added that “[the Court’s] obligation is to define the liberty of all, not 
to mandate [its] own moral code.”84 To this sentiment, Robson proposes 
an extension of Pierce v. Society of Sisters—holding that the fundamental 
right to liberty precludes the government from standardizing its chil-
dren.85 Thus, living autonomously in the way that Lawrence, Romer, and 
Griswold intended implies that adults should also be free from the gov-
ernment’s same moral standardization.86 
The Court’s elaboration on the arbitrary nature of right and wrong is 
perhaps most clear in Roe v. Wade.87 Justice Blackmun opens his opinion 
in Roe by quoting Lochner v. New York’s “now-vindicated dissent”: 
“[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. at 407 (theorizing that morals cannot be judged by standards of reasonableness 
and rationality and, therefore, should not be within the government’s domain to regulate). 
 80 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 81 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571, 578. 
 82 Id. at 582; see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not 
a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”). 
 83 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (referring to Bowers, 478 U.S. 186). 
 84 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
850 (1992)); see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645 (1996) (noting that even if an act was 
morally wrong, enforcing laws against the act involves intruding into the private lives of citi-
zens). 
 85 Robson, supra note 74, at 491. 
 86 See id. 
 87 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or 
novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the 
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution 
of the United States.”88 The opinion highlights that the criminalization of 
abortion is a relatively new phenomena and was not traditionally as ostra-
cized as the State of Texas made the public believe.89 The common law 
did not have penalties for early abortions, suggesting that philosophical, 
theological, and civil and canon law concepts thought that life did not 
begin until the fetus became ‘formed’ or recognizably human.90 Christi-
anity adopted this line of thought, first articulated by Aristotle and re-
flected in the writings of St. Augustine.91 In those writings, St. Augustine 
explicitly states that humans did not have the power to determine the dis-
tinction between the possession of life and a soul during fetal develop-
ment.92 This is in stark contrast with the current moral justification for 
criminalizing abortion: life begins at conception.93 Justice Blackmun ex-
posed when this argument shifted. Since the common belief was not al-
ways that life began at inception, early anti-abortion laws—that perhaps 
not-so-coincidentally began once enslaved persons became free—were 
justified for medical safety.94 At the time, abortion procedures were haz-
ardous for women, and the concern could have been genuine.95 Upon the 
modernization of medicine, however, the abortion procedure was rela-
tively safe for women.96 The convenience of morality then arose; the ar-
gument to maintain anti-abortion laws shifted from the protection of the 
woman to the protection of the fetal life.97 This argument—as the Court 
points out—has no basis in legislative or social history.98 These examples 
show the capricious nature of moral narratives as grounds for law. At what 
point—and by whom—was it decided that life began at conception? 
 
 88 Id. at 117 (alteration in original) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 89 See id. at 129. 
 90 Id. at 133. In a footnote, the Court noted that “[e]arly philosophers believed that the 
embryo or fetus did not become formed and begin to live until at least 40 days after conception 
for a male, and 80 to 90 days for a female.” Id. at 133 n.22 (citations omitted). 
 91 Id. (citation omitted) (“Aristotle’s thinking derived from his three-stage theory of 
life . . . vegetable stage was reached at conception, the animal at ‘animation,’ and the rational 
soon after live birth. This theory . . . came to be accepted by early Christian thinkers.”). 
 92 These theories were seemingly drawn from the religious text Exodus 21:22. Id. 
 93 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 148, where Justice Blackmun highlights that. despite never being 
taken seriously, pro-life arguments continue to justify anti-abortion laws as “the product of a 
Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct.” 
 94 Id. at 134, 148. 
 95 Id. at 148-49. 
 96 Id. at 149. 
 97 Id. at 151. 
 98 Id. 
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When professionals in medicine, philosophy, and theology cannot come 
to a consensus as to when life begins, the government is “not in a position 
to speculate as to the answer.”99 
Morality can serve as the veil for the government’s power moves 
because moral norms are not static. This flexibility allows those in control 
to—under Foucault’s theory—create and to recreate the binary system 
that defines power: redefining the “licit and illicit, permitted and forbid-
den” behavior as the times demand it.100 Let’s not forget, however, that 
discriminatory and oppressive governmental action often wears the ugly 
mask of morality. Historically, principles of morality, tradition, and “di-
vine ordinance” were used to justify discrimination and criminalization 
for behavior that was considered unacceptable.101 As time has shown, 
however, those masks can—and will—be removed, and the unconstitu-
tional efforts to maintain power will be exposed. 
III. THE “PROCREATION PRESCRIPTION” 
A. The Procreation Prescription Under the 45th President 
Taken individually, free speech, religious liberty, and budget priori-
ties justify many of the Administration’s actions surrounding reproduc-
tive rights.102 As with all rules, however, these justifications do not exist 
in a vacuum. Collectively, the actions, along with the surrounding circum-
stances of the imposed rules, tell a much richer story of the Administra-
tion’s intended moral code.103 Thus, to fully understand the current Ad-
ministration’s actions in context of the historical regulation of women’s 
sexuality, several of the recent actions must be considered together. The 
“Procreation Prescription” suggests a clear theme that encourages absti-
nence and ensures women will be held accountable if they do not follow 
this standard. This section provides an overview of the Administration’s 
regulatory actions about women’s sexuality from 2016 to 2018: moral ex-
emptions for providing birth control coverage; a significant increase in 
 
 99 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 
 100 FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 83. 
 101 See, e.g., Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concur-
ring). 
 102 Several of the promulgated rules or regulatory changes align with the goal of the Ad-
ministration’s May 4, 2017 Executive Order—”Promoting Free Speech and Religious Lib-
erty.” Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty, Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 
21,675 (May 4, 2017). 
 103 In Doe 1 v. Trump, the Court declared that courts must consider the circumstances 
surrounding the announcement of a President’s policy when determining whether animus mo-
tivated a law. Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 213 (D.D.C. 2017). The Court determined 
that even if the actions alone would be sufficient for a court to conclude a constitutional vio-
lation, taken together they are highly suggestive of a constitutional violation. See id. 
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budgetary and program support for abstinence-only sexual education; an 
increase in limitations on Title X funding; the reduction of teen pregnancy 
programs; and several reductions in support for global initiatives. 
1.  Moral Exemption for Providing Birth Control Coverage 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was passed in 2010 with the inten-
tion of providing rights and protections to make healthcare more afforda-
ble, fair, and accessible to understand.104 Immediately following the 
ACA’s passage, the Women’s Health Amendment (WHA) to the Act was 
created to address the gender disparities in out-of-pocket health care costs 
and to further women’s ability to be equal participants in society.105 The 
final product required coverage for women’s preventive care and screen-
ings in alignment with the guidelines developed by the Health Resources 
and Services Administration (HRSA) and the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS).106 The final product included other services, such 
as screenings for gestational diabetes in pregnant women, counseling for 
domestic violence, preventative care visits, and providing the “full range” 
of FDA-approved contraceptive methods.107 The WHA—upon the review 
and the consideration of over 600,000 comments on the proposed rules—
included its own accommodations and exemptions for houses of worship 
and religious employers.108 The Administration extended the accommo-
dations and the exemptions, in a guidance document, to for-profit entities 
with objections based on religious grounds under the ruling in Hobby 
 
 104 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
http://perma.cc/E8TC-R3S7 (last visited Dec. 22, 2018); see also Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1001, 2713(a), 124 Stat. 119, 130-32 (2010) (cod-
ified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13) (2018). 
 105 ACLU Complaint, supra note 32, at 4, 6. 
 106 Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838, 47,839-40 (Oct. 13, 2017) (to be codified 
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 107 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 10, Washington v. 
Trump, No. 2:17-cv-01510 (RBL) (W.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Washington v. 
Trump Complaint]. Contraceptives include oral contraception, rings, patches, barrier methods, 
injections, emergency contraception drugs, intrauterine devices (IUDs), and sterilization. Id. 
 108 Complaint at 14, Shiraef v. Hargan, No. 3:17-cv-00817 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 31, 2017) [here-
inafter Shiraef v. Hargan Complaint] (citing Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under 
the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,871 (July 2, 2013)) (plaintiffs voluntarily 
dismissed without prejudice); see also Press Release, Ams. United for Separation of Church 
& State, Declaring Victory For Plaintiffs, Groups Withdraw Lawsuit Against Trump Admin-
istration’s Harmful, Discriminatory Birth Control Rules (Feb. 2, 2018), http://perma.cc/2JJ2-
3Y6P. 
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Lobby.109 This exemption and accommodation feature allowed “an ob-
jecting entity either to sign a one-page form stating its objection to provid-
ing contraceptive coverage and to submit that form to the federal govern-
ment, or to notify the entity’s insurance company.”110 The insurance 
company would then administer and directly pay for the contraception 
coverage of the individual employees or students by communicating di-
rectly with them, which eliminated the objecting entity as a middle 
man.111 This accommodation process ensured that women could access 
affordable FDA-approved contraception.112 As a result of these require-
ments, eligible organizations filed lawsuits throughout 2014 and 2015, 
claiming that filling out the required one-page form was a “trigger” to 
women receiving contraceptive coverage and, therefore, violated their 
rights.113 The U.S. Supreme Court, consolidating the cases in Zubik v. 
Burwell, directed that the parties “be afforded an opportunity to arrive at 
an approach” that protected both parties.114 The Departments of Treasury, 
Labor, and HHS (“the Departments”) sought solutions from the public 
and received over 54,000 comments, but no feasible solution was 
found.115 HHS responded with updated guidelines specifying that cover-
age should also include the instruction of fertility awareness-based meth-
ods for women who desire an alternative to contraception.116 
On May 4, 2017, the President signed an Executive Order—”Pro-
moting Free Speech and Religious Liberty”—directing agencies to “con-
sider issuing amended regulations, consistent with applicable law, [and] 
to address conscience-based objections to the preventive-care mandate 
promulgated under Section 300gg-13(a)(4) of title 42, United States 
Code.”117 As a result, the Departments issued Interim Final Rules (IFRs), 
 
 109 Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. at 47,842; Shiraef v. Hargan Complaint, supra 
note 108, at 14-15. 
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 111 Id. at 15. 
 112 See id. at 14. 
 113 See, e.g., Little Sisters of Poor House v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015); Ge-
neva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015); Priests 
for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 114 Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016). 
 115 Marcia Coyle, 54,231 Comments Later, A Contraceptive Coverage Dispute Is Still Un-
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 116 Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838, 47,844 (Oct. 13, 2017) (to be codified 
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 117 Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty, Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 
21,675, 21,675 (May 4, 2017). 
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which were effective as of October 6, 2017.118 The IFRs broadened the 
entities eligible for an exemption, so that any private university, non-
profit, for-profit business, or other non-governmental employer may re-
fuse to cover contraception in its group health insurance plans without 
notifying the government or anyone else.119 One rule also broadened the 
permissible reasons to seek an exemption, moving beyond “sincerely held 
religious beliefs” to include “sincerely held moral convictions.”120 Fur-
ther, the accommodation process became optional for objecting entities, 
which previously required and ensured that employees and students 
would continue to receive seamless contraceptive coverage.121 The De-
partments justify these changes by focusing on the FDA’s coverage of 
certain types of contraception—such as the IUD and other emergency 
contraceptives—that go beyond fertilization prevention to potentially pre-
vent embryo implantation.122 This action reveals that the Administration’s 
real issue with birth control is that, even within a marriage, it represents 
the “willful splintering” of sex from its “moral end or goal”: to repro-
duce.123 The “pro-life” rules fail to consider, though, that the contracep-
tion coverage requirement was associated with a historic decrease in the 
abortion rate.124 After the Departments proposed the IFRs, the State of 
Pennsylvania successfully received a preliminary injunction in December 
2017, preventing the enforcement of the rules, with Judge Beetlestone 
 
 118 Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Ser-
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stating that “[i]t is difficult to comprehend a rule that . . . intrudes more 
into the lives of women.”125 The Northern District of California followed 
and issued a preliminary injunction only six days later, finding that “the 
2017 IFRs transform contraceptive coverage from a legal entitlement to 
an essentially gratuitous benefit wholly subject to their employer’s dis-
cretion.”126 
In response to these injunctions, the Administration made several im-
material changes to the 2017 IFRs. The Final Rules were each promul-
gated on November 15, 2018, and are set to take effect on January 14, 
2019.127 Namely, “the Final Rules place increased emphasis on the avail-
ability of contraceptives at Title X family-planning clinics as an alterna-
tive to contraceptives provided by women’s health insurers.”128 This is 
ironic given the Administration’s efforts to decrease Title X funding and 
services.129 As a result, the plaintiffs in California v. Health and Human 
Services filed a second amended complaint and a motion seeking to enjoin 
the January implementation of the Final Rules.130 The motion was 
granted, but only for the Plaintiff States.131 The following day, Judge Bee-
tlestone reviewed Pennsylvania v. Trump once again; this time, however, 
the State of Pennsylvania, now joined by New Jersey, filed a motion also 
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Final Rules.132 Judge Beetlestone 
 
 125 Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 585-87 (E.D. Pa. 2017), appeal docketed, 
No. 17-1253 (3d Cir. Feb. 15, 2018) (issuing a preliminary injunction because: (1) the plaintiff 
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junction). 
 126 California v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 281 F. Supp. 3d 806, 830 (N.D. Cal. 
2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558 (9th 
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 129 See infra Section II.A.iii. 
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found that enjoining the implementation of the Final Rules nationwide 
was the only way to provide the Plaintiff States with “complete relief” 
and to protect its citizens from the harm of losing their contraceptive cov-
erage.133 
Now that the accommodation process—which once required insur-
ance companies to cover contraception expenses—is optional, employers 
that opt out will effectively make a statement that they will only employ 
women that comply with their moral codes. In turn, this change introduces 
privacy issues for women during the job search process. Specifically, it 
requires women—who rely on contraception coverage—to expose their 
view of sexual liberty in the interview by asking if the company covers 
contraception. This shift reemphasizes that the workplace is inherently 
male-defined; it reinforces that a woman is inseparable from her role as a 
potential or an actual mother, while fatherhood is not considered in as-
sessing a man’s suitability as an employee in the workplace.134 
2.  Abstinence-only Education 
Another major action that must be considered, alongside the Moral 
and Religious Exemption Final Rules, is the Administration’s shift to-
wards, and increased budget for, abstinence-only sex education. The Pres-
ident’s budget in 2018 outlined an increase of $271 million in funding for 
abstinence-only education through 2022; this budget was significantly re-
duced from $204 million in 2008 to $10 million in 2016.135 Abstinence-
only education is partly funded through the Title V State Abstinence Ed-
ucation Grant Program (SAE). The SAE program’s purpose is to address 
teen pregnancy rates among adolescents who are most likely to bear chil-
dren out of wedlock.136 HHS outlines the program’s design, “as defined 
by Section 510(b) of the Social Security Act,” as having the “exclusive 
purpose” of teaching adolescents: the benefits of “abstaining from sexual 
activity,” that “abstinence from sexual activity outside marriage” is “the 
expected standard,” “that a mutually faithful monogamous relationship in 
 
 133 Id. at *32-33 (explaining that, among other things, limiting an injunction to Pennsyl-
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the context of marriage is the expected standard of human sexual activ-
ity,” that sexual activity outside of wedlock is “likely to have harmful 
psychological and physical effects,” and “how to reject sexual ad-
vances.”137 It should be noted, however, that the legislature amended the 
statute—effective on March 23, 2018—to remove the aforementioned 
language and to change “abstinence education” to “education on sexual 
risk avoidance” that is “medically accurate and complete,” “age-appro-
priate,” and “culturally appropriate.”138 
Abstinence-only education encourages gender stereotypes, contains 
questionable scientific assertions, and ultimately compromises people’s 
ability to exercise their legal sexual rights.139 It perpetuates the govern-
ment’s historical use of marriage as a means to control women, and sets 
a foundation for the government’s regulation of sexuality, denying 
women ownership of their bodily autonomy. 
In 2015, California was the first state legislature to declare that ab-
stinence-only education is unlawful on the grounds of medical inaccuracy 
and bias.140 In response to the legislature’s implementation, parents, on 
behalf of their children, challenged Clovis Unified School District’s bi-
ased and inaccurate curriculum.141 The California Superior Court issued 
an order granting the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees.142 The court 
cited evidence that indicates the type of hetero-normative and morally-
charged materials that public schools use in their classrooms, including 
videos that: compared “a woman who is not a virgin to a dirty shoe,” 
stated “boys and men are physically unable to stop themselves once they 
become sexually excited,” and claimed that “something bad will happen” 
if they engaged in sex outside of marriage.143 A deposed teacher attested 
to reinforcing gender stereotypes by presenting a “timeline of sexual 
arousal which asserted that men become aroused at French kissing, but 
that women become aroused later, at ‘heavy petting.’”144 
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In addition to imposing a moral standard, abstinence-only education 
is not an evidence-informed practice. A 2007 congressionally-mandated 
study of federal abstinence programs found that abstinence-only educa-
tion does not decrease the rate of sexual activity among teens.145 In fact, 
states whose sexual education programs emphasize chastity and absti-
nence for teenagers have higher teen pregnancy rates, more “shot gun” 
marriages, and lower average ages of marriage and first births.146 These 
effects are associated both with lower income and higher divorce rates.147 
On the other hand, students that participate in medically-accurate, com-
prehensive sex education programs are more likely to delay the initiation 
of sex and to use condoms when they do engage in sex.148 Governmental 
actions that counter research and studies are more likely to be considered 
“overbroad generalizations” that are not substantially related to their im-
portant objectives under intermediate scrutiny in constitutional law.149 
3.  Limitations on Title X Funding (Defunding Planned 
Parenthood) 
To essentially defund Planned Parenthood, HHS has proposed a rule 
that statutorily prohibits giving Title X funding to any family planning 
program where abortion is offered as an option.150 HHS proposed this rule 
in response to a “Joint Resolution Providing for Congressional Disap-
proval” that nullified a 2017 resolution barring states from withholding 
Title X from family planning service providers for any reason other than 
their ability or inability to deliver Title X services.151 Among other ele-
ments, a key feature of the rule includes: 
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“Protecting Title X health providers so that they are not required to 
choose between the health of their patients and their own consciences, by 
eliminating the current requirement that they provide abortion counseling 
and referral. The proposal would not bar non-directive counseling on 
abortion, but would prohibit referral for abortion as a method of family 
planning.”152 
The rule also seeks to “protect” women and children who have been 
victims of sexual assault by “[p]roviding counseling to minors on how to 
resist attempts to coerce them into sexual activities.”153 This change dis-
regards the Administration’s previous efforts to decouple funding from 
the political climate or religious beliefs. 
4.  The Reduction of Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs 
The Administration has also attempted to nullify $213.6 million in 
funding for 80 institutions across the country that have scientifically-de-
signed programs aimed at preventing teen pregnancy.154 The Teen Preg-
nancy Prevention Program (TPP)155 was enacted through the Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act of 2010 and was reauthorized in the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018.156 Under the program, 
$101,000,000 was authorized for “competitive contracts and grants to 
public and private entities to fund medically accurate and age appropriate 
programs that reduce teen pregnancy.”157 The 2015 award cycle issued 
grants for a five-year project cycle that was set to end in June of 2020.158 
In July of 2017, however, program recipients received an annual notice 
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of grant award from HHS indicating that their project period would end 
on June 30, 2018.159 According to an HHS Press Release entitled “Teen 
Pregnancy Prevention Program Facts: False Claims vs. The Facts,” HHS 
proclaimed that the program’s funding ended because “rigorous evalua-
tion studies” found that TPP was not working, “cannot be the reason for 
the drop in teen birth rates,” and was a “waste of taxpayer money.”160 In 
a suit brought by the Public Citizen Litigation Group, the District Court 
for District of Columbia found that HHS’s early termination of the TPP’s 
funding was in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).161 
5.  Additional Efforts 
Other administrative actions have flown under the radar for the av-
erage media consumer. Additional initiatives include removing U.S. 
funding from the United Nations Populations Fund, which supports re-
productive health, family planning, HIV/AIDS prevention, and infant and 
maternal health across the globe.162 The Administration also re-expanded 
the “gag rule,” a Reagan-era policy that denies U.S. funding or aid to or-
ganizations that counsel on or make referrals for abortion, both domesti-
cally—for Title X receiving organizations—and abroad.163 The Admin-
istration’s unprecedented expansion of the rule, also known as the 
“Mexico City Policy,” “banned US family planning funds from going to 
foreign non-governmental organi[z]ations (NGOs) that provide abortion 
services, counselling, or referrals, or advocate for liberali[z]ation of their 
country’s abortion laws—even if they use non-US government funds for 
these activities.”164 Additionally, HHS created a new “Conscience and 
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Religious Freedom Division” in its Office for Civil Rights (OCR).165 This 
addition expands and creates a mechanism to enforce moral, conscience, 
and religious protections for healthcare providers that are opposed to par-
ticular services;166 this will severely impact and undermine women’s bod-
ily autonomy. 
The aforementioned attacks are among many others that have oc-
curred on a federal level, and more are anticipated in the upcoming 
years.167 Developing a collective understanding of the Administration’s 
efforts to impose the Procreation Prescription must be done in the context 
of the Prescription’s historical development, as described in the next sec-
tion. 
B. Historical Oppression Through Sexuality 
1.  The Power of Consent 
Until the late 1700s, it was commonly believed that women were not 
fully realized humans, and that women did not possess a different and 
complete biological make-up.168 Female genitalia were considered to be 
the same as male genitalia except internal rather than external,169 justify-
ing the argument that women were inferior to men. When anatomists first 
illustrated a distinctly female skeleton, they proved that men and women 
had basic, unique, and arguably equal biological structures.170 This dis-
covery uprooted the reliance on divine order to justify the patriarchal fam-
ily structure that had existed for millennia.171 When the biological argu-
ment that women were inferior to men no longer sufficed, consent became 
the basis to maintain unequal human relationships.172 Indications of 
power over women’s sexuality were clear in the consistent messaging that 
men were unable to control themselves around women, and, thus, the onus 
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was on women to resist.173 Many social policies in the 20th century were 
based on women’s power, or lack of power, to say no to men, until the 
movement for women’s sexual liberation escalated in the 1920s.174 At that 
point, women’s power to say yes quickly lost them their previous power 
to say no,175 illustrating Foucault’s “negative relation theory.”176 As a re-
sult, the movement prompted an uptick of divorces where men claimed 
that their wives were not interested enough in sex or were not exciting 
enough;177 a shift that exemplifies the power granted by sexual freedom. 
In a society built around the needs of white men and with no accom-
modations for pregnancy in the workplace, contraception bans in the 
1950s successfully ensured that women could only engage in the public 
sphere if they had restraint.178 For instance, entering the workforce re-
quired women to “both abstain[] from engaging in sexual activity with 
men and . . . [to] successfully fend off any unwanted sexual advances 
from male colleagues;”179 a message that the Administration echoes cur-
rently.180 
2.  Sexuality as a Means to Maintain White Supremacy 
Women’s sexuality was used to maintain not only the power of men 
over women, but also the power of white over non-white. At a time when 
property owners were almost exclusively white, customs and laws forbid-
ding white women from having sex with non-white men protected control 
of property and family wealth through marital acquisition and inher-
itance.181 
To further the goal of maintaining white supremacy, the regulation 
of reproductive rights shifted back and forth, depending on the purpose 
that it served. In 1803, when Great Britain outlawed slavery, and America 
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and France both refused “to join in blockading the coast of Africa,” Brit-
ain used war ships to create an 8,000 foot long barrier “to prevent slave 
ships from leaving Africa with their terrible cargo.”182 Because of this 
effort, there was a “vast shortage of new slaves coming to America,” so 
“slave owners were forced to start slave breeding farms.”183 This horrific 
practice involved “the strongest and biggest buck” being paired with a 
virgin, fertile girl in a “crude hay-filled pen” to be “bred” while others 
looked on.184 At this time, a blind eye was turned away from the “tradi-
tional” morals that are touted today because property owners—those run-
ning the labor camps of enslaved people—believed reproduction was nec-
essary to create a workforce when manpower was limited.185 
Years later, in the late 1800s, the government was concerned about 
low-income and immigrant populations “outbreed[ing] Anglo-Sax-
ons.”186 As a result, the acceptance and encouragement of oral contracep-
tives was either morally sound or discredited based on the demographics. 
For instance, some South African leaders claimed that birth control was 
being peddled in black communities for the purpose of “black geno-
cide,”187 while historians credit the same fears for fueling the birth control 
bans in the United States.188 The criminalization of contraception—based 
upon moral-based grounds—therefore played a crucial role in preventing 
“race suicide” among middle and upper class whites.189 This is also ap-
parent in the timing of the criminalization of abortion—an accepted prac-
tice in most states until after the Civil War.190 
Anti-miscegenation laws relied on morality to maintain white su-
premacy until Loving v. Virginia outlawed them in 1967.191 Stemming 
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from the Racial Integrity Act of 1924 and arising from the “extreme na-
tivism which followed the end of the First World War,”192 such laws for-
bade the marriage of white persons to non-white persons to “preserve the 
racial integrity of its citizens,” and to prevent “the obliteration of racial 
pride” and “the corruption of blood.”193 In Naim v. Naim, the Supreme 
Court of Virginia upheld Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute because 
marriage had “more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than 
any other institution.”194 The Court’s perspective in Naim must be viewed 
in the context of Skinner v. Oklahoma: “Marriage and procreation are fun-
damental to the very existence and survival of the race . . . . [Power] [i]n 
evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the 
dominant group to wither and disappear.”195 Thus, the laws in place for a 
significant portion of the 20th century relied on morality as an explicit 
“endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy”—as Justice Warren 
stated in declaring the anti-miscegenation statutes as unconstitutional.196 
While white men were not allowed to marry women of color, they 
were allowed to target them as release for sexual aggression. Laws that 
protected girls from sexually predatory men were generally not enforced 
against African-American and Mexican-American girls.197 Since the 
group in power considered these girls to be “morally inferior,” they were 
proper sexual targets for men.198 This concept allowed an “acceptable” 
space in the social order for, what naturalists considered to be, a predis-
posed biology of men as sexual predators;199 in addition, this space for 
perversion was accommodated during the “breeding” of enslaved peo-
ple.200 
The government’s use of sexuality and motherhood, as a means for 
control and furtherance of white mainstream culture, is further exhibited 
by the historical and the current trend of removing black and brown chil-
dren from their families and their mothers’ homes. “Jane Crow Laws,” 
the crisis in black communities where children are taken away from their 
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biological mothers at disproportionate rates,201 date back to the slave era, 
when those in charge used the sale of family members to separate owners 
as a strategy to oppress and to disempower enslaved people. With the en-
actment of the Indian Child Welfare Act, Congress acknowledged the im-
pact of child removal: “[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the 
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children.”202 
Native American children were removed from their parents and placed 
with white families at unprecedented rates, a practice that was instrumen-
tal in whitewashing and attempting to eradicate Native American cul-
ture.203 The Indian Child Welfare Act has played a significant role in the 
protection of Native American mothers and children, but is now at risk of 
being dismantled.204 
The removal of children from their homes has dramatically increased 
in recent years and has seemingly punished mothers who are relying on 
few resources.205 These practices have been—and remain—in place be-
cause it is easier to control a person that has been both physically and 
emotionally burned. Children have served as a tool for evoking fear and 
for dictating obedience to the sought after behavior. This is seen with the 
Administration’s ramped up immigration policy, separating thousands of 
children from their parents at the border and placing them in shelters.206 
Former Attorney General recently justified this practice on biblical 
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grounds.207 These laws, policies, and practices further strip women of 
color of their autonomy and their power as a familial unit. In addition to 
being told when and how to have sex and to procreate, women are pre-
scribed to comply with an “expected standard”208 of parenthood and be-
havior. Otherwise, they are further punished for what has historically been 
referred to as “moral inferiority.”209 
Although the Thirteenth Amendment outlawed slavery, the Recon-
struction Amendments collectively failed to remove the vestiges of slav-
ery as intended. Regulating sexuality, reproduction, and motherhood was, 
and still is, a primary tool for white supremacists to retain power in the 
American caste system. 
3.  Marriage and the Social Order 
Given that HHS is currently touting the concept of marriage, it is 
unnecessary to review history to know that the government dictates “a 
mutually faithful monogamous relationship in the context of marriage [as] 
the expected standard of human sexual activity.”210 For centuries, though, 
placing a value on a woman’s chastity has been the primary means of 
encouraging the cornerstone of society: marriage. The prospect of unre-
strained sexuality was a threat because it removed the need for marriage, 
a key instrument in maintaining social order.211 The use of marriage, in 
creating alliances—amongst kingdoms and within castes—and in retain-
ing wealth and influence, was at the heart of how the world operated.212 
In more modern times, removing the need for marriage has been concern-
ing because of the large role it plays in capitalism and, more generally, 
the public good.213 Husbands were, and still are, expected to conform to 
the social and legal obligations of their wives.214 Specifically, men were, 
and still are, expected to provide financial support to their families, which 
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requires them to be steadily employed and to avoid criminality.215 Mar-
riage and procreative sex equate to a more secure labor force, a concept 
that Former House Speaker Paul Ryan fully embraced.216 
Marriage was also the primary means to strip women of their power, 
ensuring that men remained at the top of the social hierarchy. Once mar-
ried, a woman could no longer exercise legal rights on her own behalf, 
removing her right to enter into contracts, to own property in her name, 
or to direct her career path.217 In New England, the Puritans often accused 
an unmarried women who owned property of witchcraft and, as a result, 
she was executed.218 Today—as acknowledged in Obergefell v. Hodges—
the government continues to incentivize marriage with numerous rights 
and benefits, including tax benefits, immigration rights, medical decision-
making authority, and property rights.219 The government’s incentiviza-
tion of marriage highlights its underlying desire to maintain the social or-
der. 
4.  Criminalization of Sex 
Additionally, criminalization played a large role in discouraging be-
havior that countered the sanctity of marriage. Seduction laws, for in-
stance, criminalized “seduc[ing] and ha[ving] illicit connection with an 
unmarried female of previous chaste character [under] a promise of mar-
riage.”220 By relying on the creation and reinforcement of gender norms, 
the government sold the idea that the “chaste woman” was too weak to 
resist sex when pitted against powerful and determined men.221 A defense 
to the seduction crime perpetuated this idea: to claim that the victim was 
not of “previously chaste character,” which some states retained until the 
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1990s.222 Although Rape Shield Laws forbid this defense in the court-
room, 223 vestiges of this sentiment are still seen today with the media’s 
regular use of character attacks to counter rape and assault accusations.224 
Sexuality was also criminalized through fornication laws that pun-
ished women for having consensual sex outside of marriage.225 In contrast 
with seduction laws, fornication laws at least recognized a women’s sex-
ual agency.226 The enforcement of fornication laws was arbitrary, but 
these laws, similar to “anti-sodomy” laws, sent a “symbolic message of 
disdain” to those engaging in behavior that was considered to be im-
moral.227 Many of these laws, with the intention to mandate a traditional 
moral code and to criminalize non-marital and non-procreative sex, re-
mained in existence until the 1970s.228 
5.  Women as Moral Decision-Makers 
The lack of deference given to women as moral decision makers, as 
is clear from the opinions of Justices throughout time, served as the foun-
dation of seduction and fornication statutes.229 When the Supreme Court 
first stated that a woman may be “unmarried and not affected by any of 
the duties, the complications, and the incapacities arising out of the mar-
ried state,” they made sure to clarify this statement as an exception to the 
general rule.230 Even in opinions that could be presented as seemingly 
furthering women’s rights—or, at the very least, protecting them—the 
Justices regularly undermine the rights of women and speak of them as 
agents of offspring production. In Muller v. Oregon, the opinion clarified 
that the legislative protection—limiting women to a ten hour work day—
”was not designed to further women’s economic interests, power or role 
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in the workplace.”231 Instead, the laws were argued as protections of 
women’s reproductive organs and maternal functions,232 dissipating the 
idea of the woman as a whole.233 The law views women-as-independent-
and-moral-decision-makers secondary to women-as-potential-or-actual-
mothers.234 
The precedent underlying this notion could have faded into the back-
ground of history, but, instead, a circuit court upheld this idea as recently 
as 1989.235 In U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, the Seventh Circuit upheld a 
company’s policy that pregnant women or women “capable of bearing 
children” cannot be placed in jobs with lead exposure.236 The policy de-
fined “women . . . capable of bearing children” as “all women except [for] 
those whose inability to bear children [was] medically documented.”237 
One petitioner in the case chose to be sterilized to avoid losing her job.238 
In overturning this decision, the Supreme Court finally—in 1991—
acknowledged that focusing on women as a reproductive beings is a prob-
lem and strips them of equal employment opportunity.239 
The rationale used to limit women’s reproductive rights has focused 
on women as incapable of making moral decisions for themselves. Rather 
than trust a woman to decide what is best for her and her future, courts 
prefer to strip women of that burden to avoid increasing her anxiety.240 
6.  Purity and Pregnancy 
Once the laws and the structures that shunned and criminalized 
women who engaged in sex outside of marriage no longer had power, the 
focus shifted to deterring pregnancy. The societal view of contraception 
use has shifted back and forth since the modern inception of the condom 
in 1861 and the FDA’s approval of the birth control pill (“the pill”) in 
1960.241 By 1965, almost 6.5 million women in America were on the 
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pill.242 The shifts in the pill’s acceptance correlate strikingly to the shifts 
in power that it bestowed, and to whom it bestowed that power. In that 
same year, Griswold v. Connecticut framed the pill’s first acceptance as 
“the right of marital privacy.”243 While this was a step in the right direc-
tion, Griswold does not declare the rights of all women, but, instead, high-
lights women’s increased accessibility for the men they belonged to. By 
holding that contraception was allowed in the context of marriage—in an 
era when marital rape was not criminalized—Griswold stripped many 
women of what little power they had to say no to sex with their hus-
bands.244 While on birth control, women were ripe for the taking at any 
point in the month—including ovulation—without the repercussion of 
pregnancy. Defining the marital home as a constitutionally protected “pri-
vate sphere” was problematic for women in 1965. Privacy in the home—
in an era that largely promoted the home as the woman’s workplace and 
domain—served a role in the deregulation of spousal sexual violence.245 
Only voluntary motherhood shifted sexual power to women, allowing 
women to control the timing and the manner of sexual relations with their 
husbands.246 
Although approximately ninety-five percent of people will have sex 
prior to marriage,247 many politicians continue to advocate for abstinence-
only education and for “marriage as the only acceptable realm for sexual 
expression.”248 The “traditional family” agenda invokes fear and perpet-
uates the shame already associated with women’s sexuality.249 Judith 
Levine, author of Harmful to Minors, The Perils of Protecting Children 
from Sex, argues that these views “plac[e] girls on a pedestal of purity” 
which is “not the same as respect and only perpetuates the division of the 
female population into virgins and whores.”250 The message sent to girls 
today is that they should not feel sexual desire. If they do, and act on their 
sexual desire, then they must deal with the consequences.251 This is true 
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even though the sexual education that they have access to—and the rules 
that are dictated to them—“left out basic, crucial information.”252 
The first movement insisting that sexual desire was as fundamental 
to a woman’s character as it was to a man’s character arose in the early 
twentieth century.253 In alignment with the movement, propaganda at-
tacked what was clearly a fear of women’s control over men.254 The “non-
pure woman,” one that was not a criminal, was depicted as immoral, dan-
gerous, and worthy of shunning.255 The era prompted images of women 
using sex to manipulate men, including the concept of gold-diggers and 
the seductress that lured good married men into sexual affairs.256 
Women’s unleashed sexuality was feared because it was powerful, and a 
threat to the social order. The contradiction in expectations for men and 
women rings loud and clear in the current decade. As recently as 2017, a 
man with a reputation for sexually assaulting minors was heralded as a 
lead candidate in a Senate race,257 yet powerful and successful women are 
regularly thrusted from their careers after men expose privately taken 
nude photos of them.258 
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This narrative—focused on purity and procreative sex—delegates 
that a woman’s worth is valued by her chastity.259 The historical focus on 
women’s sexual restraint as a basis for legislation only reinforces the 
amount of power that their sexuality harnesses. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of current and historical circumstances, the Procreation Pre-
scription dictates to girls and young women that, in some ideal version of 
morality, sex is wrong, marriage is right, and they—as women—are re-
sponsible to resist against men’s impulses. The Procreation Prescription 
ensures that those girls follow this expected standard later in their careers 
by working for organizations that align with the messages they received 
in school. As a result, those organizations will further reinforce that mes-
sage by denying them contraception and ensuring that they are held ac-
countable for owning their sexuality. The suppression of organizations, 
programs, and health providers that offer the full spectrum of information 
on sexuality furthers the current Administration’s imposed moral regula-
tion. The Administration justifies all of their actions as pro-life and pro-
religion, but history, context, and the lack of support for the lives resulting 
from unplanned pregnancies tells us otherwise.260 It is not a coincidence 
that the states currently trying to challenge Roe and to restrict women’s 
right to choose have the most “alarming infant and maternal mortality 
rates,” and were the last to ratify the 19th Amendment, dragging their feet 
to give women the right to vote.261 Women’s obedience to the morals that 
the Procreation Prescription imposes on them pays off handsomely for the 
men with the power to make these legislative decisions. The men in 
charge avoid regulatory burdens, receive tax cuts, and—most im-
portantly—have less competition for their power because their female 
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counterparts are unable to control their reproductive and economic desti-
nies. A line must be drawn. It should be drawn before employed women 
must sacrifice the right to exercise their own moral beliefs, while their 
employers enjoy the fullest exercise of that same right.262 It should be 
drawn before only women of certain classes or only women who reside 
in certain states have access to all available information and sexual health 
options. 
As shown throughout history, the only consistent aspect about mo-
rality is that it changes. It changes from decade-to-decade, from group-to-
group, and from person-to-person. It even changes within an individual 
from year-to-year.263 In a country allegedly founded to support the exer-
cise “of fundamentally differing views,”264 the supposed morals of an ad-
ministration or an organization cannot be relied upon to govern one’s ac-
cess to their own rights. And, if courts allow moral arguments—as a moral 
minimum—shouldn’t pregnancy, like sex, be wanted and welcomed?265 
Justice Breyer, in his 2018 dissent in NIFLA v. Becerra, commented on 
the law’s role on reproductive rights: “We have previously noted that we 
cannot try to adjudicate who is right and who is wrong in this moral de-
bate . . . [b]ut we can do our best to interpret American constitutional law 
so that it applies fairly within a Nation whose citizens strongly hold these 
different points of view.”266 
The desire to maintain a power structure that prioritizes the rights of 
men—under the veil of morality—dictates that marriage and motherhood 
remain destinies that women must fulfill.267 Jurisprudence reinforced 
these destinies and decided that these destinies outweigh the imposed bur-
den on and stolen autonomy of the women whose decisions are being 
made on their behalf by men. Although Planned Parenthood v. Casey was 
limited in the extent of women’s autonomy it granted, it remains a pioneer 
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in acknowledging women’s right to be their own decision-makers.268 The 
Justices in Casey explicitly state that one may only exercise their moral 
rights to the extent that “they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s 
exercise of the right to choose.”269 The Administration’s recent actions 
carefully allow the choice to maintain in their approach towards repro-
ductive health and motherhood, but remove “any vestige[] of power and 
respect” from the decision-making.270 The delicate dance is not acci-
dental, as the Administration’s past and present efforts to regulate the sex-
ual choices of women make it clear that it is “more important to withdraw 
[women’s] power than to overturn the right.”271 
“I ask no favors for my sex. I surrender not our claim to equality. 
All I ask of our brethren is, that they will take their feet from off 
our necks, and permit us to stand upright on th[e] ground . . . .”272 
– Sarah M. Geimke 
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